Build layered defenses against prompt injection in RAG applications.
Attack Path
Attacker -> Malicious Content -> Knowledge Base -> Retriever -> LLM -> Tool/Data
Trust Boundaries
Separate system policy, user input, retrieved documents, tool results, and external content.
Retrieval Authorization
User -> Identity -> Document ACL -> Retriever -> Authorized Context
Detection
Use layered classifiers and rules for suspicious content, but do not rely on keyword matching as the only defense.
Tool Restriction
A summarization agent should not have destructive production tools.
Tool Authorization
LLM -> Tool Request -> Policy -> Risk Check -> Approval -> Execution
Testing
Build adversarial cases for direct injection, indirect injection, obfuscation, malicious PDFs/webpages, tool manipulation, and multi-turn attacks.
Metrics
Track injection attempts, successful attacks, block rate, unauthorized retrieval, unauthorized tool calls, and false positives.
Final Takeaway
Prompt injection requires defense in depth: secure retrieval, untrusted-content isolation, limited tools, external authorization, monitoring, and continuous testing.
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